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Abstract
We analyze indirect evolutionary two-player games to identify the dynamic emergence
of (strong) reciprocity in a large number of economic settings. The underlying evo-
lutionary environment allows for an arbitrary initial population state provided that
every degree of the compact space of reciprocity is adherent to at least one individ-
ual of the corresponding continuum population. The basic results, which essentially
maintain the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, are, in several directions, context
dependent, and minimum valid for the wide class of evolutionary dynamics which
hold for regularity and payoff-monotonicity. The evolutionary solution concept which
is applied to elevate the explanatory power of emerging Nash equilibria is dominance
solvability, in this case, for continuous strategy spaces. An asymmetric aspect comes
into play since the actions of the evolutionary players are not only determined by the
current state of reciprocity but also by their inherent, context-free preferences towards
others which differ among one another devoid of being endogenized in the time span
of the dynamic process at hand.
Keywords: Reciprocity; Evolutionary Game Theory; Dominance Solvability; Asym-
metric Game Setting; Payoff-monotonic Dynamics
∗Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, it has been established that the orthodox assumption on material or mon-
etary1 selfishness of players is not necessarily sustainable in economic modeling. While
the assumption of exogeneous given selfishness fits fairly well in some economic contexts,2
real life evidence and experimental data suggest that people do not behave consistent with
this postulate in general. Most convincing studies include ultimatum/dictator games (e.g.
Güth et al., 1982; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Camerer, 2003), or public goods contribution
games (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2002).
The present research contributes to the literature by analyzing a dynamic model of
reciprocity in an evolutionary framework.3 In essence, reciprocity refers to peoples’ desire
to reward perceived kindness and to punish perceived unkindness. The present form of
reciprocity invokes the idea that subjective values include to be sensitive to opponents’
intrinsic preferences. More precisely, our suggestion of players’ psychological payoff in-
cluding other-regarding motivations follows the model of Levine (1998) who demonstrates
a striking consistency with results from experimental lab studies. Levine shows that his
model is useful to understand several results from ultimatum games and market experi-
ments. Formally, player i seeks to maximize her subjective well-being, given by4
vi = ui +
∑
j 6=i
αi + λ · αj
1 + λ · uj ,
where ui and uj are material payoffs, αi,αj ∈ (−1, 1) are social preference parameters, and
λ ∈ [0, 1] symbolizes a weight which player i puts on player j’s preference. Accordingly,
individuals are not only concerned with their own material payoff but also with that of
their opponents. This fact is in the first place due to intrinsic preferences like altruism.
However, by considering an extra dimension of reciprocity5, the individual weight which is
1Putting the meaning of selfishness to an economic environment is essential for the present study and
related models with so-called other-regarding preferences. To make this point, consider Joel Sobel’s com-
ment on the hypothesis only the selfish survive: “with sufficient freedom to define “selfish” this statement
is a tautology” (Sobel (2005, p. 430)). In other words, motivations may depend on others’ motivations
but their exclusive personality is a banality in the final analysis. This thinking appears trivial yet corre-
sponds to a famous theory called “psychological egoism” which claims that anything we do for others is
just because of increasing our own welfare.
2Generally, in highly competitive settings with many players and with one-shot and/or anonymous play
(e.g. financial markets), one can assume that the average behavior reflects a high degree of material greed.
3As described in the next section, one should be aware of the fact that reciprocity has different definitions
in the economic literature. See also the survey paper by Sobel (2005) for this issue.
4This functional is the exact writing of Levine (1998, p. 597). Sethi and Somanthan (2001) intro-
duce a similar model by replacing player i’s weight on player j’s material profit [αi + λ · αj ] / [1 + λ] by
[αi + λ · (αj − αi)] / [1 + λ], where 0 ≤ αi < 1 and λ ≥ 0. Their specification allows an altruist to place
a negative weight on a selfish individual which is not possible under Levine’s definition. Apart from the
denotative conception of reciprocity and for the sake of technical simplicity, the precise definition of the
players’ subjective payoffs are once more slightly modified in the present study.
5Although Levine does not explicitly connect with the term “reciprocity” in his study (however, Sethi
and Somanthan do), the parameter λ clearly represents much of the features of reciprocity in any environ-
ment of non-anonymous interaction.
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placed on the opponents’ profit varies additionally with respect to the opponents’ intrinsic
preference. The advantage of the well-being functional with two preference dimensions is
that it allows us to explore why people sometimes behave contrary to their true attitudes
or ethos. In particular, the daily observance, whether in economic or other social life set-
tings, of intrinsic good people behaving badly (or selfishly) sometimes or intrinsic selfish
(or bad) people behaving well sometimes centers the motivation of the current study.
Technically, we use an indirect evolutionary environment to identify the cultural viabil-
ity of reciprocity in a broad class of pre-programmed populations where the players engage
in many different types of strategic two-player games. Indirect evolution allows the players
to choose a behavior which follows their perceptive payoffs but the players receive evolu-
tionary fitness (or reproductive success) according to their “true”, objective payoffs. The
presupposition that players aim to maximize their own idiosyncratic preferences but that
economic success “regulates the market” is by now a central tenet in economic modeling
and successfully opposes the neo-classical feature of pure economic selfishness. Conse-
quently, a reciprocity disposition which yields a larger objective payoff tends to become
more prevalent in a certain population while dispositions with relative low objective payoffs
tend to decease. The idea that social preferences beside selfishness are profitable in some
strategic environments is well documented in the relevant literature and dates back at least
as far as Schelling (1960). The basic reason for this is that (at least somewhat) recognized
preferences provide a commitment device which makes unselfish players potentially the
better performers in interdependent settings. Another precursor of this theme is Frank
(1987, 1988) who finds that recognizable emotions have the strategic power to change the
actions of others, and therefore features the ability to increase the profit of the possessors.
Güth and Yaari (1992) then formally introduce the approach of indirect evolution. In fact,
they use this approach to challenge a form of reciprocity by having regard for individuals
who have tendencies for rejecting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, the
reciprocity motive is somewhat restricted there because the agents are not able to feel
subjective benefits from proposing fair distributions. In line with related literature, the
finding of Güth and Yaari is that the observability of types guarantees that reciprocators
gain from their attitudes in material terms while opportunists relatively loose.6
In the present study, we analyze the evolving of reciprocity in the wide frame of regular
and payoff-monotonic selection processes. For that purpose, we use a result which is shown
by Heifetz et al. (2007): if the evolutionary game on the level of biases (which is located at
equilibrium behavior which results from the players’ idiosyncratic well-being functionals) is
dominance solvable, in the sense of Moulin (1984), for continuous preference spaces, then,
the limiting population can be characterized under any payoff-monotonic selection dynam-
ics. The replicator dynamics for general distributions (cf. Oechssler and Riedel (2001)
for a detailed technical survey) is subsumed by the class of payoff-monotonic growth-rate
6Huck and Oechssler (1999) illustrate viability of preferences for rejecting unfair divisions even if pref-
erences are unobservable provided that the population is small and that the distribution of preferences is
known in the population.
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functions that is applied to the present study. The more general class considered here
explicitly allows to interpret the evolving of reciprocity not just on a biological level but
rather on a cultural level of learning (including imitation) or education where a reciprocity
disposition that is adequate to achieve higher material returns is replicated faster. Note
that our approaching is somewhat enhanced in comparison with the practice of a group
of research articles that assumes the evolving of other-regarding issues (like reputation,
social preferences, positional goods, ideologies, and so on) on a biological level and treats
the results simply as a metaphor to interpret the dynamics in terms of cultural spreading.7
Yet, this is not the only reason why the present methodological approach is prepared for
exploring reciprocity. In alignment with the dynamical system, we are allowed to assume
any arbitrary initial population distribution provided that it is described by a compact
interval of reciprocity. This technical feature equips the results with a striking general
character.
A first observation of our work shows that a sufficient reciprocal player who is in-
trinsically spiteful (altruistic) may behave benevolent (spiteful) if the opponent player is
sufficient contrary in the intrinsic attitude and the strategic situation requires that kind
of behavior. In fact, the sign of the players’ overall concern for the other players’ payoff is
always determined by the strategic situation, i.e. the players show a positive concern for
the other players if strategic complements are present and a negative concern if strategies
are substitutes—a result which is reminiscent to related work of Possajennikov (2000) and
Bester and Güth (1998). A further observation says that if player A’s intrinsic preference
lies below a certain threshold (if player A is relatively spiteful), then player A’s tendency
to reciprocity is higher the lower the intrinsic preference of player B (the nastier player
B)—if player A’s intrinsic preference lies above the threshold, then player A’s tendency to
reciprocity is higher the higher player B’s intrinsic preference is. The threshold depends
on the strategic type of the underlying game.
The remainder of the paper works as follows. The first part of section 2 surveys some
recent approaches of reciprocity or fairness in economics which are, in some obvious sense,
connected with the present study. The second part illustrates why our treatment of sub-
jective payoff perception, involving reciprocity, has the strategic power to resolve social
dilemma conflicts. Section 3 then introduces the basic model under which the viability of
reciprocity is analyzed. Section 4 concludes. Technical details about the applied dynamics,
and a figure and a table, that specify some initial conditions, appear in the appendices.
7Answering the question whether preference evolution relies on a biological or cultural selection process
is a subtle task and rarely elucidated in much detail in related work. However, in our case, it is indeed
useful to examine reciprocity on a rather short-termed cultural level since we assume two differently treated
preference dimensions which initiate the equilibrium actions: one (altruism/spite) is exogeneous given and
not evolving while the other (reciprocity) is endogenized and evolving. With these specifications, it is
appropriate to think of reciprocity as a cultural norm which changes within the time span of cultural
spreading while altruism/spite changes more seldom by gene transmission. For a deeper understanding
of the different selection processes (and the associated speed differences) in evolutionary game theory, see
Selten (1991).
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2 On Reciprocity
2.1 Related Models and Current Treatment
In order to explain the emergence of other-regarding preferences, there are by now several
studies that try to identify more or less complicated models which give insight into the
economic psychology of people in strategic situations. The common theme in these models
is the antithesis to the neo-classical assumption that people’s behavior is thoroughly driven
by material selfishness. In order to narrow the wide spectrum of recent approaches and
to connect with the present work, it is useful to concentrate on prominent models which
explicitly incorporate a certain motive of reciprocity or fairness.8 One such class assumes
that subjective benefits are motivated from inequity aversions of own and other’s economic
gains. Put differently, the players’ actions are initiated by distribution considerations. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) propose for this approach. In their regard, the subjective well-being
functional of player i in the standard two-player setting is formalized as
Ui = pii − αimax[pij − pii, 0]− βimax[pii − pij , 0],
where pii, pij are material payoffs and αi ≥ βi ≥ 0, βi < 1 are weight parameters. Hence, the
perceptive payoff of player i differs significantly in the issue whether she and her opponent
j are approximately equal rich in economic values; viz., the players are pre-programmed to
feel satisfaction from being about as rich as the opponent players. To further summarize,
the players are inequity-averse (αi, βi ≥ 0), dislike inequity more if it springs from own
relative loss (αi ≥ βi), but like gaining profit more than reducing inequity (βi < 1). A
similar model, also motivated by the idea that the players aim to reduce inequity in their
material payoffs, is developed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In the two-player setting,
Bolton and Ockenfels assume that the personal well-being of player i is determined via
the (possibly non-linear) term
Ui = vi
(
pii,
pii
pii + pij
)
,
where vi (·, ·) is globally non-decreasing, concave in the first argument (the material pay-
off of player i), and strictly concave in the second argument (the relative material payoff
of player i). The models of Fehr/Schmidt and Bolton/Ockenfels are both motivated by
the idea that players act according to satisfy their fairness emotions by reducing eco-
nomic inequity. However, the players in these models are distributional motivated and
do not explicitly estimate the individual types of the opponents, i.e. the players do not
differentiate in the other players’ intentions or preferences. Inspired by the psychological
8Usually, the will to reciprocate springs from the will to being fair. However, the concept of fairness is
likewise of somewhat ambiguous use in economics. At this point, we refrain from a broader discussion on
fairness and point to the well-being functionals of this section for examining the specific conception.
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game-theoretical approach of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), there is a somewhat more com-
plex class of fairness models which accounts for these elements and seems to reflect reality
more detailed. In psychological games, the players’ preferences depend on their beliefs
about the other players’ intentions. By using normal form games, Rabin (1993) proposes
for this technique. With his notation, he assumes that individual i plays according to her
expected utility
Ui (ai, bj , ci) = pii (ai, bj) + f˜j (bj , ci) [1 + fi (ai, bj)] ,
where ai, bj , and ci are, in this order, the strategy chosen by player i, the belief of player
i about the strategy of player j, and the belief of player i about the belief of player j
about the strategy of player i. pii (ai, bj) is player i’s material payoff, f˜j (bj , ci) is player i’s
belief about the kindness of the opponent j towards player i, and fi (ai, bj) symbolizes the
kindness of player i towards player j. If equilibrium play is reached, the players’ beliefs
about the other players’ intentions are true and the players base their actions on these
beliefs and the subsequent actions of the other players. In line with Rabin’s approach
but with the purpose to expand to extensive form games, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) assumes a similar model. The basic difficulty of the extensive form is given by the
fact that the players have to adjust their perceived utility by updating their beliefs about
the others’ intentions at each node of the sequential game tree to ensure useful results.
Contrary, in Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Rabin (1993), the players have only initial
beliefs about the others’ intentions which make the equilibrium analysis easier. Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) and Charness and Rabin (2002) propose equilibrium models which ba-
sically incorporate both aspects the distributional one and the intention-based. However,
opposing to the approach used in the current paper, the applicability of these models is
somewhat limited which is basically due to the assumption of higher order beliefs about
the others’ intentions and the appearance of many equilibria. Levine’s model and the
version used here depict a third way of modeling reciprocity. In particular, the subjective
utility functions of the players depend on the beliefs about the intrinsic preferences of
others, i.e. the players reciprocate to the perceived preference of the respective opponent
player.
From the previous sentences, it becomes clear that the meaning of reciprocity is am-
biguous in terms of functional forms subsuming a motive of fairness. However, discrimina-
tions of reciprocity are multi-dimensional existent. In the following, we will mention some
further basic facets which appear repeatedly throughout the literature. One prominent
aspect is to distinguish between weak and strong reciprocity. Weak reciprocity stands
for the conception that people reciprocate in order to gain higher material returns in the
future by sustaining collaboration. Typically, weak reciprocity relies on reputation and
repeated interaction in orthodox economic modeling and is basically not different from
pure selfishness in social preference terminology. In a key paper, Trivers (1971) uses the
term reciprocal altruism which is identical to weak reciprocity for which he shows sustain-
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ability under infinite repeated interactions.9 In contrast, strong reciprocity refers to the
conception that people show cooperative or retaliatory behavior, even if there is no reason
to expect higher material returns in the future (e.g. Gintis, 2000). Moreover, people are
willing to sacrifice own profit in order to either help friends or harm enemies. Under this
aspect, strong reciprocity is really other-regardingly intended.10
The differentiation of positive and negative reciprocity among the literature is self-
explanatory (e.g. Hoffmann et al., 1998). Loosely speaking, positive reciprocity describes
the tendency to reward kind people while negative reciprocity describes the tendency to
harm cruel people.
Another common aspect is to differentiate between direct and indirect reciprocity (e.g.
Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Direct reciprocity describes the routine that if ‘person A
helps (harms) person B, then person B helps (harms) person A’ while indirect reciprocity
states that if ‘person A helps (harms) person B, then person C helps (harms) person A’.
The specific notion of reciprocity used in the current paper is determined by the sub-
jective well-being functionals of section 3 and the underlying methodological approach,
and, in this regard, described as follows.
In comparison with the significant recurrent features of economic reciprocity, the present
shape exhibits the following attributes:
• preference-based
• strong (intrinsic)
• both, positive or negative
• indirect.
Though, the stated attributes are not intended to identify an objective, “true” definition
of reciprocity in economics. More precisely: the aim of this paper is not to elucidate the
meaning of reciprocity how it should be used in economics but rather to assume a form
of reciprocity that exhibits some predominant features which appear frequently in the
literature, and to explore under what circumstances this form of reciprocity can survive
in an evolutionary process.
9As already discussed in the literature, the denotation “reciprocal altruism” appears somewhat inade-
quate in this respect, cf. Hoffmann et al. (1998, p. 338). They argue convincingly that “I am not altruistic
if my action is based on my expectation of your reciprocation”. Another thread of research comments
that weak reciprocity is not reciprocity and would therefore probably be unhappy with Trivers’ denotation
even in this aspect. For example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002, C3) write: “It is important to emphasize
that reciprocity is not driven by the expectation of future material benefit. It is, therefore, fundamentally
different from “cooperative” or “retaliatory” behaviour in repeated interactions.”
10For obvious reasons, Sobel (2005) substitutes “strong” with “intrinsic”, and “weak” with “instrumen-
tal”.
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2.2 A Simple Illustration
As we will see, the implications of strong reciprocity which we obtain in our basic model
are somewhat intricate to retrace (however, the trend and interpretation of these results re-
main on a plain level). So, the following formulation of the symmetric two-player prisoners’
dilemma is intended to give a simple illustration why the current treatment of subjective
payoff perception, involving reciprocity, has the strategic power to resolve social dilemma
conflicts and overcome spite.11 Consider the following 2× 2 matrix.
cooperate defect
cooperate ξ − υ, ξ − υ −υ, ξ
defect ξ,−υ 0, 0
Figure 1: A Prisoners’ Dilemma
As is the rule in the matrix design, one player is the row player and the other plays the
column; the first number in each matrix entry is the payoff received by the row player and
the second one belongs to the column player. The strategy cooperate is connected with a
private loss of υ > 0 and a benefit to the other player of ξ > υ. The strategy defect yields
neither a loss nor a benefit. If two intelligent and self-interested individuals play this game
exactly once, we face the well-known dilemma where both players defect in order to reach
a higher payoff regardless of the strategical choice of the other player. However, cooperate
would be mutually better since both players’ outcome is higher under this strategy profile:
ξ − υ > 0 with ξ > υ.
Under a simple model of natural selection the same dilemma defines the usual situation.
If we think of a population with size N consisting of k cooperators, and hence N − k
defectors, the reproductive matrix payoffs (or fitnesses) are given by
fC =
k − 1
N − 1ξ − υ (cooperators)
and
fD =
k
N − 1ξ (defectors),
and the average fitness is determined by f = kN (ξ − υ). In any mixed population the
defectors reach a higher fitness than the cooperators so that natural selection tends to
decline the fraction of cooperators while the fraction of defectors eventually take over the
whole population. Hence, without any model arrangement which favors the outcome of
cooperation, the dilemma of the one-shot game trivially persist under natural selection
where matrix payoffs correspond to fitnesses.
Consider now the notion of player i’s perceived payoff which we use in the following
11The prisoners’ dilemma is the leitmotif in Sethi and Somanthan (2003) for surveying economic reci-
procity in the evolutionary game theoretic literature. The current version uses a different notion of reci-
procity.
8
chapters, i.e.12
Ui = pii + θi · pij with θi = αi · γi + (1− αi) · γj ,
where αi ∈ [0, 1] defines the individual “norm of reciprocity”, and γi, γj ∈ [−1, 1] defines
the individual “intrinsic preference”.13 Note that if γi 6= 0, then player i puts a non-zero
weight on the material payoff of player j (unless the extremly rare case where αi · γi +
(1− αi) · γj = 0 with γi 6= 0; however, even in this case individual i is intrinsically biased
but her disposition does not come into effect only because her reciprocity norm and the
intrinsic preferences of both players compensate to zero). Hence, we say that player i is
biased if γi 6= 0. Further, we say that player i is materialistic if both hold true γi = 0
and αi = 1, since then θi = 0, i.e. the material outcome of player i coincides with her
perceived payoff. Accordingly, a materialist places no weight on the other players’ payoff
while a biased player i places a weight of ρbi on the payoff of a biased player and a payoff
of ρmi on the payoff of a materialist, where
ρbi = αi · γi + (1− αi) · γj ; ρmi = αi · γi.
If two biased player interact, we reach the following payoff matrix.
cooperate defect
cooperate ξ − υ + ρbi (ξ − υ) , ξ − υ + ρbj (ξ − υ) −υ + ρbiξ, ξ − ρbjυ
defect ξ − ρbiυ,−υ + ρbjξ 0, 0
Figure 2: A Prisoners’ Dilemma with Biased Players
Provided that ξ−υ+ρb• (ξ − υ) > ξ−ρb•υ and −υ+ρb•ξ > 0, and thus ρb• > υξ , cooperate
is a dominant strategy for both players (the • stands for either i or j). Note that if À
αi · γi + γj > αi · γj and Á αj · γj + γi > αj · γi then ρb• > 0 and (cooperate, cooperate)
is potentially a Nash equilbrium, depending on the ratio of benefit and loss. It is easily
comprehended that both inequalities À and Á hold if both players have altruistic feelings
towards others, i.e. γi, γj > 0. But even in the case of different intrinsic preferences, i.e.
sign (γi) 6= sign (γj), the reciprocity motive is apt to keep cooperate as the agreed strategy.
For example, if player j is moderate spiteful, say γj = −0, 6, and player i is perfectly
altruistic, γi = 1, a high reciprocity norm of player j, say αj = 0, 3, can reverse player
j’s natural will to defect. Note that the ability to reciprocity gives a strong impetus to
the game. Even if a player has a strong intrinisic attitude (|γi| is close to 1) a perfect
tendency to reciprocity (αi = 0) will always overcome the origin will to either cooperate
or defect if the other player has a contrary intrinsic attitude (sign (γi) 6= sign (γj)) since
then sign (θi) = sign (γj) 6= sign (γi). Of course, if both players are spiteful, i.e. γi, γj < 0,
then À and Á never hold and the only rational strategy is always defect.
12Cf. Eqs. (1) and Eqs. (3) in section 3. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all dispositions are
perfectly observable.
13In our main model in section 3 we exclude perfect intrinsic preferences for technical reasons. This is
not necessary for the current illustrative purpose.
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In the case that a biased player i meets a materialistic player j, the action of the biased
player is determined by her intrinsic preference and independent of her reciprocity motive,
since the sign of ρmi (and thus the sign of γi) induce whether to cooperate or defect.
Naturally, a materialist always defects and is in the advantageous free-reding position if
the opponent is a cooperating benevolent player. Clearly, the pros and cons of being biased
in the matrix PD game continue in a standard population model where the matrix payoffs
correspond to fitnesses.
The prisoners’ dilemma essentially illustrates the strategic advantages which can result
from the reciprocity motive when two biased players interact where one player is sufficient
altruistic and the other is intrinsically malevolent but sufficient reciprocal to overcome this
attitude. It also demonstrates that two altruists can always resolve the social dilemma
but the reciprocity motive is not apt to overcome the will of an altruist to cooperate
if the other player is materialistic in the above sense. Hence, the expected evolutionary
advantages which results from the reciprocity motive seem to depend heavily on the initial
population distribution regarding the intrinsic preferences of the players.
3 Model
In this section we will introduce our model of strong reciprocity, state our main result
under the assumption that the players perfectly recognize each others types, and interpret
the results.
Let there be a large population of evolutionary agents. At each instant in time a pair
of agents is matched at random to play the game ΓU = ({1, 2} , {x, y} , {U1, U2}) with the
aim to maximize their subjective well-being, determined by
U1 = pi1 + θ1 · pi2 (1a)
U2 = pi2 + θ2 · pi1, (1b)
where pi1 and pi2 are material or “economic” (and therefore interpersonal comparable)
payoffs (e.g. money). In order to incorporate a broad variety of strategic situations in this
study, we assume that the material payoffs are defined by
pi1 = x · (l · y − x) + x (2a)
pi2 = y · (l · x− y) + y, (2b)
where x, y ∈ [0,∞) describe the actions or efforts of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
The parameter l ∈
(
l < 0, l > 0
)
determines the characteristic nature of the game by mea-
suring the kind and extent of strategical interdependence; the l is further specified as soon
as required. The specification of the economic payoffs is sufficiently general to illustrate
success since the economic interpretations are extensive. The simplest example is a pro-
duction game with either negative or positive externalities which is determined by the sign
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of l. The externality l < 0 represents, for example, a common pool resource game where
the players exploit a resource with efforts x and y, respectively. Accordingly, the higher
player A’s input the lower player B’s payoff. Oppositely, l > 0 determines a game where
a more aggressive behavior of one player increases the payoff of the other player like in
public good contribution settings. Alternatively, one can assume oligopolistic competition
where the efforts are either firms’ quantity choices (in a Cournot market) or price choices
(in a Bertrand market).
The variables θ1,θ2 symbolize the subjective overall concern for the respective oppo-
nents’ profit, and have deeper meanings, as specified by
θ1 = α · γ1 + (1− α) · γ2 (3a)
θ2 = β · γ2 + (1− β) · γ1, (3b)
where the parameters γ1,γ2 are intrinsic preferences or attitudes, either altruism or spite14
(γ1,γ2 include also material selfishness at the peak of neutrality). The variables α,β iden-
tify the dispositions to reciprocity which belong to player 1 and player 2, respectively.
While the dimension of altruism and spite is an exogenous trait, the dimension of reci-
procity is endogenized in the model. This distinction allows, for example, a player who
is rather altruistic inclined to behave spiteful in a reciprocal manner, however, by keep-
ing the true character. Or, a player who is rather spiteful by nature is able to behave
benevolent without changing the true character during the course of selection. From these
specifications, one should think about reciprocity as a cultural norm or convention which
is changeable by the dynamical pressures, and in this line, provides the distinct flexibility
in the players’ behavior. It is more for the sake of distinctiveness that we will sometimes
refer to the parameters γ1, γ2 as intrinsic preferences and to the reciprocity-variables α, β
as cultural norms or conventions; because, in the sense of subjective motivations which
distort the economic greed of the players and initiate their actions, α and β belong to the
class of intrinsic preferences, too. This is rather a question of definition.
In accordance with Levine (1998) and Sethi and Somanthan (2001), we avoid initially
the somewhat unnatural economic situations in which a player is less (or equally) concerned
about herself than about the opponent. Formally, the subjective overall concern for the
other player satisfies |θ1| , |θ2| < 1. To ensure this, we impose the following restrictions on
the preference components:
γ1, γ2 ∈ A = [−1 + , 1− ]
α, β ∈ B = [0, 1] ,
(4)
where  is positive and small. Both assumptions are intuitively plausible. The first one al-
lows the players to exhibit a negative (“spite”: γ1, γ2 < 0), a neutral (“egoism”: γ1, γ2 = 0),
or a positive (“altruism”: γ1, γ2 > 0) intrinsic preference towards others. The second as-
sumption is even more intuitive and shows that the players evaluate their overall concern
14Alternatively, one can assume that envy or malevolence is the opposite preference to altruism.
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by a convex combination of the own and the other players’ intrinsic preference. Note that
α, (β) induce reciprocal actions only if α, (β) 6= 1 since in the case of α, (β) = 1 the
agents’ subjective overall concern is independent of the opponents’ intrinsic preference.
Accordingly, we have the following notion.
Definition 1. The agents possess a tendency to reciprocity whenever α, (β) ∈ B \ {1}.
Evidently, the intuition of these assumptions is in line with the restriction of the sub-
jective overall concern towards others, which is finally fixed by |α · γ1 + (1− α) · γ2| =
|θ1| , (|β · γ2 + (1− β) · γ1| = |θ2|) < 1. More precisely, with intrinsic traits of altruism
and spite and the present distribution of reciprocity, the players are completely identified
over the compact space
θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ = [−1 + , 1− ] . (5)
The game setup is close to the one of Harrison and Villena (2008) but differs significantly
in several aspects. First, Harrison and Villena concentrate on game settings which exhibit
negative externalities (∂pi1(x,y)∂y < 0,
∂pi2(x,y)
∂x < 0) and strategic substitutes (
∂pi1(x,y)
∂x∂y <
0, ∂pi2(x,y)∂x∂y < 0). This means that a higher input of player A lowers both the actual
payoff and the marginal payoff of player B. From Eqs. (2) and their first and second
order derivatives it is easy to see that the present setting represents negative externalities
(∂pi1(x,y)∂y < 0,
∂pi2(x,y)
∂x < 0) and strategic substitutes (
∂pi1(x,y)
∂x∂y < 0,
∂pi2(x,y)
∂x∂y < 0) if l < 0,
and positive externalities (∂pi1(x,y)∂y > 0,
∂pi2(x,y)
∂x > 0) and strategic complements (
∂pi1(x,y)
∂x∂y >
0, ∂pi2(x,y)∂x∂y > 0) if l > 0.15 Note that with l = 0 there is no strategic interdependence so
that economic competition becomes “monopolistic”. Consequently, the present model
incorporates a much broader class of strategic games.
A second difference regards the evolutionary analysis. While Harrison and Villena use
the ESS concept to illustrate the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, we use dominance
solvability as proposed by Heifetz et al. (2007). The lack of ESS is that its predictions
are only static. ESS does not explore to what level evolution will lead the evolving trait
of a certain population but can only tell whether a somehow reached population state
is immune to rare “mutations”.16,17 Contrary, dominance solvability is useful to establish
dynamic results with respect to many initial population states that evolve according to
the broad class of regular, payoff-monotonic dynamics.
According to the indirect evolutionary approach, the players maximize their subjective
well-being which leads to a second stage game located at equilibrium behavior (or on the
level of biases). Let this game be symbolized by Γf = ({1, 2} , {α, β} , {f1, f2}), where f1, f2
15The terminology to characterize the strategic environment was introduced by Bulow et al. (1985) in
order to distinguish games with upward sloping best-response functions from those with downward sloping
best-response functions.
16Formally, a strategy x∗ is ESS, if either i) pi(x∗, x∗) > pi(x, x∗) or ii) pi(x∗, x∗) = pi(x, x∗) and pi(x, x) <
pi(x∗, x) for all mutations x 6= x∗, see Maynard-Smith and Price (1973).
17Another lack of ESS is the insufficiency for characterizing dynamic stability of certain evolutionary
dynamics like replicator or BNN with continuous strategy sets (cf. Hofbauer et al., 2009, and some references
therein).
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are the reproductive success defining fitness functions that can be identified by substituting
equilibrium behavior in the economic payoffs (Eqs. (2)), which formally corresponds to
f1, f2 = pi1(x∗, y∗), pi2(x∗, y∗),
where x∗, y∗ are equilibrium strategies of ΓU = ({1, 2} , {x, y} , {U1, U2}). Thus, let
both players maximize their perceived payoffs, i.e. x∗ ∈ argmaxx U1(x, y∗) and y∗ ∈
argmaxy U2(x∗, y), which defines their reaction functions: x = 12 (1 + ly (1 + θ1)) and
y = 12 (1 + lx (1 + θ2)). Equalizing the reaction functions identifies the unique equilibrium
profile of the game (x∗, y∗), where
x∗ = − θ1l + l + 2
l2 + θ2l2 − 4 + θ1l2 + θ1l2θ2 (6a)
y∗ = − θ2l + l + 2
l2 + θ2l2 − 4 + θ1l2 + θ1l2θ2 . (6b)
From the equilibrium profile, we can comprehend the strategic influence of player A’s
regard for player B’s payoff on player B’s strategy. The strategic influence is consistent
with the psychological idea that individuals condition their actions on the perceived types
of others and do not act uniformly with each other. At this point, it becomes clear that the
relatedness of the other players’ type and the own equilibrium action requires a positive
degree of recognition. Note again that we have assumed this ability of the players in the
perfect sense.
Plugging the equilibrium actions in the material payoff functions leads to the individual
fitnesses which are functions of the biases,
f1 (θ1 (γ1, γ2, α) , θ2 (γ1, γ2, β)) = pi1(x∗, y∗) = −(θ1l + l + 2)
(−l + θ1l − 2 + θ1l2 + θ1l2θ2)
(l2 + θ2l2 − 4 + θ1l2 + θ1l2θ2)2
(7a)
f2 (θ1 (γ1, γ2, α) , θ2 (γ1, γ2, β)) = pi2(x∗, y∗) = −(θ2l + l + 2)
(−l + θ2l − 2 + θ2l2 + θ1l2θ2)
(l2 + θ2l2 − 4 + θ1l2 + θ1l2θ2)2
.
(7b)
Eqs. (7), the equilibrium payoffs, are the central functionals which measure the preva-
lence of the different types in the game (the specifications of the dynamic process—where
successful types proliferate at the expense of abortive types—are given in the Appendix
A).
In the following, we assume that the intrinsic preference of player 1 is not exactly the
same as the intrinsic one of player 2, i.e. γ1 6= γ2. This assumption gives the game Γf
an asymmetric character and is reasonable in order to adopt reciprocity in the model.
In the case of γ1 = γ2, it would be sufficient to behave according to the intrinsic prefer-
ence altruism or spite to fulfill the characteristic of reciprocity. Formally, there are now
two different populations but with intrinsic traits of altruism and spite selected from the
same pool. Somewhat informal, one can imagine that nature picks γ1, γ2 from the equal
distributed set A “with two hands at once”. Based on the usual asymmetric setting in
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evolutionary games (cf. Selten, 1980; Weibull, 1995, pp. 64), let us imagine an ex ante
symmetric game, denote ΓγΓf . In this game any intrinsic preference parameter is assigned
to each of the players with the same probability. This assumption corresponds to “nature
plays first” by allocating γ1, γ2 to player 1 and player 2. Relying on Selten’s work, the
pair of reciprocity biases (α, β), where α is associated with γ1 (i.e. the biases of player
1 are given with γ1 and α) and β is associated with γ2, would be evolutionarily stable
in the sense of ESS in the ex ante symmetric game ΓγΓf if and only if the vector (α, β)
describes a strict Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric game Γf . However, as mentioned
before, the question of interest regards the conception of dominance solvability, and hence,
the question of which type pass the dynamic evolutionary pressures under many starting
conditions.
The following lemma is useful to identify a dominance solvable trait (cf. Heifetz et al.,
2007; Moulin, 1984, Theorem 4).
Lemma 1. In order to check for dominance solvability of a particular trait it is sufficient
to compute that
(i) the fitness function is continuous, twice differentiable and strictly concave in the
particular trait of each player;
(ii) the slope of each player’s best-reply function is less than 1 in absolute value;
and to argue that
(iii) the particular trait is selected from a compact interval.
To start with, a substantial argument for condition Lemma 1(iii) to be satisfied here
gives the following remark.
Remark. The issue of compactness or completeness of the bias spaces is rather a philo-
sophical question. At best, one should think about the opportunity to “select” the subjective
norm of reciprocity as a hypothetical choice rather than an alternative reflecting from a
permanent conscious state of mind. Accordingly, the particular values of α, β, and thus
θ1, θ2, as emotional devices come into the conscious minds and initiate the actions only
if the strategic situation requires it yet the whole spaces examining players’ potentials are
present at any time.
In order to examine the viability of reciprocity, we will base our analyses on the results
given with the Theorem of Appendix A and Lemma 1; however, we have to extend the
setting somewhat since we assume the game Γf to be asymmetric.
To emphasize the asymmetric character of the game consider now two different bias
spaces with elements θ1, θ2 since γ1 6= γ2, however symmetrical types are also possible, i.e.
θ1 = θ2. So, θ1 ∈ Θ1 = [−1 + , 1− ] and θ2 ∈ Θ2 = [−1 + , 1− ] where θ1 = θ2 only if
α · γ1 + (1− α) · γ2 = β · γ2 + (1− β) · γ1 with γ1 6= γ2. Since the position of the players’
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roles is initially by no means (i.e. the players are either in position 1 or in position 2 with
equal probability) it is relatively straightforward to construct an ex ante symmetric game
setup. Thus, the profile parameter κ = (θ1, θ2) is selected from the compact support K =
Θ1×Θ2 = [−1 + , 1− ]× [−1 + , 1− ] and determines the evolving game parameter of
the ex ante symmetric game with the distribution Gt =
(
G1t , G
2
t
)
where G1t corresponds
to θ1 and G2t to θ2; the t will sometimes be dropped for convenience.18 Then, the ex
ante symmetric game payoff of an individual with type κ = (θ1, θ2) competing with an
individual of type κ˜ =
(
θ˜1, θ˜2
)
is defined by
f (κ, κ˜) =
f1
(
θ1, θ˜2
)
+ f2
(
θ2, θ˜1
)
2 . (8)
Accordingly,
f (κ,G) = f1
(
θ1, G2
)
+ f2
(
θ2, G1
)
2 (9)
is the ex ante fitness to type κ = (θ1, θ2) under the distribution G =
(
G1, G2
)
. Having
this game texture allows us to transfer methodological results from Heifetz and Segev
(2004) who use an asymmetric game setting which is close to ours in order to identify
“the evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining” which gives the name to their essay.
Extending the terminology of domination as in the Appendix A to the asymmetric game
setting we have that κ˜ =
(
θ˜1, θ2
)
(or κ̂ =
(
θ1, θ̂2
)
) is dominated by κ = (θ1, θ2) in iteration
n + 1 if for every κ´ =
(
θ´1, θ´2
)
∈ Un we have f1
(
θ1, θ´2
)
> f1
(
θ˜1, θ´2
)
(or f2
(
θ2, θ´1
)
>
f2
(
θ̂2, θ´1
)
).
Accordingly, we reach:
Lemma 2. Dominance solvability of the asymmetric game Γf with the two players’ payoffs
f1 (θ1, θ2) and f2 (θ2, θ1) implies dominance solvability of the ex ante symmetric game ΓγΓf
with payoff f (κ, κ˜).
Using now the Theorem of Appendix A and Lemma 2, we have:
Lemma 3. If both players’ asymmetric game is dominance solvable to θ∗1 (α∗, γ1, γ2) and
θ∗2 (β∗, γ1, γ2), respectively, then the profile κ∗ = (θ∗1, θ∗2) is the unique outcome of the ex
ante symmetric game ΓγΓf under any regular and payoff-monotonic selection dynamics.
We are now able to prove our main result.
Proposition 1. Consider the game described above with l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5] and an
extra requirement as given below the proof of this proposition (the requirement specifies
18Of course, the basic evolving trait is the norm of reciprocity, α (respective β), however, for the sake
of clarity, it is sometimes benefiting to think of the overall concern as the evolving trait (consider θ1, θ2 as
an initial random weighting of α and β).
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the sets of γ1 and γ2 that we consider in different situations l). Then, any initial full-
support of the distribution of biases G =
(
G10, G
2
0
)
will converge in distribution towards a
unit mass on the pair of (θ∗1 = α∗γ1 + β∗γ2, θ∗2 = β∗γ2 + α∗γ1) with the pair of reciprocity
norms(
α∗ = 1/2 + 1/2 −4 l − 4 +
√
Λ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) , β
∗ = 1/2 + 1/2 4 l + 4−
√
Λ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)
)
,
with
Λ (γ1, γ2, l) = l4 (γ1 + γ2 + 2)2 − 4 l3
(
(γ1 + γ2 + 1)2 − 1
)
+
4 l2
(
(γ1 + γ2 + 1)2 − 1− 4 γ1 − 4 γ2
)
+ 16 l (γ1 + γ2 + 2) + 16,
under any regular and payoff-monotonic dynamics.
Proof. According to the Theorem of Appendix A and Lemmata 1-3, the procedure of the
proof is to find an equilibrium profile of the asymmetric game Γf = ({1, 2} , {α, β} , {f1, f2}),
and then check for sufficient conditions regarding dominance solvability. Thus, calculating
first order conditions of f1 (θ1, θ2) and f2 (θ1, θ2) (cf. Eqs. (7)), i.e. ∂f1∂θ1 (θ1, θ2) = 0 and
∂f2
∂θ2
(θ1, θ2) = 0, and solving for the biases yield
θ1 = − (θ2l + l + 2θ2 + 2) l
θ2l2 + l2 − 2θ2l − 2l − 4 (10a)
θ2 = − (θ1l + l + 2θ1 + 2) l
θ1l2 + l2 − 2θ1l − 2l − 4 , (10b)
where it is now reasonable to account for
θ1 = α · γ1 + (1− α) · γ2 (11a)
θ2 = β · γ2 + (1− β) · γ1, (11b)
in order to find equilibria on the level of reciprocity. To this end, we plug Eqs. (11) in
Eqs. (10), equalize α and β, and solve for the equilibria.19 Accordingly, we reach
α∗± = 1/2 + 1/2
−4 l − 4± Φ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)
19Note that, mathematically, it does not matter whether we substitute the overall concern for its com-
ponents in Eqs. (10) or in the fitness functions (Eqs. (7)).
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and
β∗± = 1/2 + 1/2
4 l + 4± Φ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) ,
where
Φ (γ1, γ2, l) =
√
Λ (γ1, γ2, l),
with
Λ (γ1, γ2, l) = l4 (γ1 + γ2 + 2)2 − 4 l3
(
(γ1 + γ2 + 1)2 − 1
)
+
4 l2
(
(γ1 + γ2 + 1)2 − 1− 4 γ1 − 4 γ2
)
+ 16 l (γ1 + γ2 + 2) + 16,
where Λ (γ1, γ2, l) > 0 if γ1, γ2 ∈ A = [−1 + , 1− ] and l ∈ [−1/4, 1]. Further, by
regarding the restrictions on γ1, γ2 and the strategic setting l, and by analyzing the result
sets of α∗± and β∗±, respectively, we find that α∗− and β∗+ are no possible solutions since
α∗− /∈ [0, 1] and β∗+ /∈ [0, 1]. In order to prove that α∗−, β∗+ /∈ [0, 1] we have to consider 8
cases, or accordingly, we have to verify 8 conditions (each condition corresponds to one
case), denote (I) to (V III). The Φ (γ1, γ2, l) is dropped in the following since it is a
positive value and of no account in any of the 8 conditions.
Case 1: Assume γ1 − γ2 < 0 and l ∈ (0, 1]. Then, α∗− < 0 implies that (I):= −4 <
−l(l − 2)(γ1 − γ2) + 4l, which is true since the right hand side of (I) is positive.
Case 2: Assume γ1 − γ2 > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1]. Then, α∗− > 1 implies that (II):= −4 <
l(l − 2)(γ1 − γ2) + 4l, which is true since the right hand side of (II) is positive.
Case 3: Assume γ1 − γ2 < 0 and l ∈ [−0, 25, 0). Then, we analyze the same condition as
under case 2, i.e. (II)=(III), but with negative l and γ1 < γ2; however, this condition
holds even under these constraints.
Case 4: Assume γ1 − γ2 > 0 and l ∈ [−0, 25, 0). Then, we analyze the same condition
as under case 1, i.e. (I)=(IV ), but with negative l and γ1 > γ2; however, this condition
holds even under these constraints.
Case 5: Assume γ1 − γ2 < 0 and l ∈ (0, 1]. Then, β∗+ > 1 implies that (V ):= 4 >
l(l − 2)(γ1 − γ2)− 4l, which is true since (V ) = (−1) · (I).
Case 6: Assume γ1 − γ2 > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1]. Then, β∗+ < 0 implies that (V I):= 4 >
−l(l − 2)(γ1 − γ2)− 4l, which is true since (V I) = (−1) · (II).
Case 7: Assume γ1 − γ2 < 0 and l ∈ [−0, 25, 0). Then, we analyze the same condition as
under case 6 (respective 2), i.e. (V II)=(V I)=(−1) · (II), but with negative l and γ1 < γ2;
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however, this condition holds even under these constraints.
Case 8: Assume γ1 − γ2 > 0 and l ∈ [−0, 25, 0). Then, we analyze the same condition as
under case 5 (respective 1), i.e. (V III)=(V )=(−1) · (I), but with negative l and γ1 > γ2;
however, this condition holds even under these constraints.
Hence, the unique equilibrium profile to be further analyzed is given by
(α∗+ = 1/2 + 1/2
−4 l − 4 + Φ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) = α
∗,
β∗− = 1/2 + 1/2
4 l + 4− Φ (γ1, γ2, l)
l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) = β
∗),
(12)
where we have dropped the subscripts “+” and “−” for convenience.
According to Lemma 1(i), the next step is to show that Eqs. (7) fulfill the properties
of
(J) “continuity”,
(I) “twice differentiability”, and
(H) “concavity”,
with respect to α (respective β). By substituting θ1 and θ2 for its components, it is easy
to comprehend that J and I are satisfied. To show H, review that we have defined the
fixed and evolving dispositions by the restrictions
γ1, γ2 ∈ A = [−1 + , 1− ] with γ1 6= γ2,
α, β ∈ B = [0, 1] ,
and the convex combinations, which totally identify the players, by
θ1 = α · γ1 + (1− α) · γ2
θ2 = β · γ2 + (1− β) · γ1
 ∈ Θ = [−1 + , 1− ]
Now, let us first check for concavity of Eqs. (7) in θ1 (respective θ2). Note that although
we deal with asymmetric fitness functions, it is sufficient to show that one player’s payoff
is concave in the overall concern, i.e. ∂2fA(∂θA)2 (θA, θB) < 0 (for A ∈ {1, 2} and B = 3− A),
since the pools of θA, θB are equal. Calculating the second derivative with respect to Eqs.
(7) yields
∂2fA
(∂θA)2
(θA, θB) = 2 l2
T (θA)
(l2 + θBl2 − 4 + θAl2 + θAl2θB)4
,
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where
T (θA) = −16 +
(
3 θB2 + θA + θB3 + 3 θB2θA + 3 θAθB + 1 + θAθB3 + 3 θB
)
l5
+
(
16 θB + 14 θB2 − 4 θB2θA − 2 θAθB3 + 6− 2 θAθB + 4 θB3
)
l4
+
(
−8 θB2θA − 8 θA − 16 θAθB + 12 θB2 + 24 θB + 12
)
l3
+
(
−4 θB2 − 8 θAθB − 8 θA + 4
)
l2 + (−16− 16 θB) l
Somewhat tedious calculations reveal that T (θA) < 0 if l ∈ [−1/4, 3/5] and θA, θB ∈ Θ,
and thus ∂2fA(∂θA)2 (θA, θB) < 0, if l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5] and θA, θB ∈ Θ. Therefore, the
players’ best replies concerning their overall biases are given by Eqs. (10). However,
whether the players’ best replies concerning their reciprocity biases are implicitly given by
Eqs. (10) is still an open question. Differentiating Eqs. (7) with respect to α (respective
β) by applying the chain rule leads to
∂2f1
(∂α)2
(θ1, θ2) =
∂2f1
(∂θ1)2
(θ1, θ2) (γ1 − γ2)2 ,
and
∂2f2
(∂β)2
(θ1, θ2) =
∂2f2
(∂θ2)2
(θ1, θ2) (γ2 − γ1)2 ,
where (γ1 − γ2)2 > 0 and (γ2 − γ1)2 > 0 in any case, and ∂2f1(∂θ1)2 (θ1, θ2) < 0,
∂2f2
(∂θ2)2
(θ1, θ2) <
0 if l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5]. Then ∂2f1(∂α)2 (θ1, θ2) < 0 and
∂2f2
(∂β)2 (θ1, θ2) < 0 under the same
constraint concerning l.
The next step is to show that the slope of the best reply functions of the asymmetric
bias game are less than 1 in absolute value (cf. Lemma 1(ii)). We derive the two players’
best reply functions concerning the reciprocity motive by calculating and solving the first
order conditions of Eqs. (7) with respect to α (respective β), or equivalently, by plugging
Eqs. (11) in Eqs. (10) and solving for the reciprocity norms. Accordingly, we reach
BR1 = α
(
β = θ2 − γ1
γ2 − γ1
)
=
(−l2 + 2 γ2l − 2 l − γ2l2) θ2 + 4 γ2 − γ2l2 − l2 + 2 γ2l − 2 l
(l2 − 2 l) (γ1 − γ2) θ2 + (l2 − 2 l − 4) (γ1 − γ2)
(13a)
BR2 = β
(
α = θ1 − γ2
γ1 − γ2
)
=
(
γ1l2 − 2 γ1l + l2 + 2 l
)
θ1 + γ1l2 − 2 γ1l − 4 γ1 + l2 + 2 l
(l2 − 2 l) (γ1 − γ2) θ1 + (l2 − 2 l − 4) (γ1 − γ2) .
(13b)
The slopes of the best reply functions are given by
BRs1 =
dα
dβ
(β) = −4 l (2 + l)
(4 + (γ1β − γ1 − β γ2 − 1) l2 + (−2 γ1β + 2 + 2 γ1 + 2β γ2) l)2
(14a)
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BRs2 =
dβ
dα
(α) = −4 l (2 + l)
(−4 + (αγ1 + 1 + γ2 − γ2α) l2 + (−2αγ1 − 2 γ2 − 2 + 2 γ2α) l)2
,
(14b)
where
sup
l∈[−1/4,0)∪(0,3/5]
∣∣∣− (4l2 + 8l)∣∣∣ ≈ 6, 24
and
inf
l∈[−1/4,0)∪(0,3/5]
γ1,γ2∈A
α,β∈B
|den (BRs1)| = inf
l∈[−1/4,0)∪(0,3/5]
γ1,γ2∈A
α,β∈B
|den (BRs2)| ≈ 8, 265,
with den (◦) symbolizing the denominator of ◦. Since 6, 24 < 8, 265 the slopes of the best
reply functions of the two players are less than 1 in absolute value, so condition Lemma
1(ii) holds.
In conclusion, by Lemmata (1-3), the ex ante bias game ΓγΓf is dominance solvable
with (α∗, β∗) as in Eq. (12) as the unique Nash equilibrium profile, and the unique profile
that survives any dynamic regular and payoff-monotonic process with full support on the
one-dimensional reciprocity space.
In order to analyze only situations where the evolutionary outcome of reciprocity lies
between 0 and 1, we need to compute the following requirement as announced in Propo-
sition 1.
Requirement. The following relation is necessary to guarantee that α∗, β∗ ∈ [0, 1] .
|Φ (γ1, γ2, l)− (4l + 4)| ≤ |l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)| . (15)
Proof. Since α∗ + β∗ = 1, it is sufficient to show that α∗ ∈ [0, 1] . Consider 0 ≤ α∗ ≤ 1
with α∗ as in Eq. (12), then we need to examine 2 cases:
Case 1: l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) < 0, i.e. sign (l) = sign (γ1 − γ2), and
Case 2: l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2) > 0, i.e. either l < 0 or γ1 < γ2.
Rearranging 0 ≤ α∗ ≤ 1 given the first case leads to
4l + 4 + l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≤ Φ (γ1, γ2, l) ≤ 4l + 4− l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
,
and the second case leads to
4l + 4− l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≤ Φ (γ1, γ2, l) ≤ 4l + 4 + l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
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Subsuming both cases gives
4l + 4− |l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)| ≤ Φ (γ1, γ2, l) ≤ 4l + 4 + |l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)| ,
and thus
|Φ (γ1, γ2, l)− (4l + 4)| ≤ |l (l − 2) (γ1 − γ2)| .
Solving for a parameter of this expression does not give much additional insight, instead,
in the Appendix B we show some representative situations that conform to this requirement
(see Figure 3 and Table 1 there).
Having proved our basic result, it is relatively simple to derive a benchmark finding
where the evolutionary players are not able to feel reciprocity.20 Let us first define a one-
dimensional population as follows.
Definition 2. A one-dimensional population here is a population as in the foregoing
environment, but without reciprocity, and where the evolving trait is simply the intrinsic
preference (the weight which is put on the opponents’ material profit). That is, α = β = 1
(cf. Definition 1), such that θA = 1·γ′A+(1− 1)·γ
′
B = γ
′
A and θB = 1·γ
′
B+(1− 1)·γ
′
A = γ
′
B,
where the “ ′” symbolizes “evolving” or “endogenized”. Also, in this settig, we allow for
γ
′
A = γ
′
B.
Then, we reach the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider the one-dimensional population described above with a strategic
interdependence according to l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5] and a mutation space given by θA =
γ
′
A, θB = γ
′
B ∈ Θ = [−1 + , 1− ]. Then, any initial full-support distribution of biases
converges in distribution towards the unit mass on l/(2− l), under any regular and payoff-
monotonic dynamics.
Proof. As we have computed that ∂2fA(∂θA)2 (θA, θB) < 0 if l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5], it suffices
to show that the slope of the best reply function is less than 1 in absolute value in this
variant setting, since twice-differentiabilty and continuity, as also requested by Lemma 1,
is obviously here. The best reply function of player A is
BRA = θA (θB) = argmax
θA
fA (θA, θB) = − (θBl + l + 2 θB + 2) l
θBl2 + l2 − 2 θBl − 2 l − 4 . (16)
20Qualitatively, the same result appears in an example of Heifetz et al. (2007).
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The slope of the best reply function is
BRsA =
dθA
dθB
(θB) =
4 (l + 2) l
(θBl2 + l2 − 2 θBl − 2 l − 4)2
. (17)
Under assumptions l ∈ [−1/4, 0) ∪ (0, 3/5] and θA, θB ∈ [−1 + , 1− ], we see that
dBRsA
dθB
= −8 (l + 2) l
(
l2 − 2 l)
(θB l2 + l2 − 2 θB l − 2 l − 4)3
< 0.
Hence, Eq. (17) is decreasing in θB, and thus maximized at θB = −1 +  and minimized
at θB = 1 − . With l ∈ [−1/4, 0), Eq. (17) is negative and the maximum absolute
value occurs at θB = 1− , where |BRA (θB = 1− )| =
∣∣∣∣4 (l+2)l(−2 l2+l2+4 l−2 l+4)2
∣∣∣∣ < 1. With
l ∈ (0, 3/5], Eq. (17) is positive and the maximum absolute value occurs at θB = −1 + ,
where |BRA (θB = −1 + )| =
∣∣∣∣4 (l+2)l(l2−2 l−4)2
∣∣∣∣ < 1. Since the variant game is dominance
solvable, we find the outcome l/(2− l) by equalizing and solving for the biases with respect
to Eq. (16), i.e. solving for θA in θA (θB = θA).
So, what is the significance of these results? By fielding this question, one should
bear in mind that although the constraints of the equilibrium, which are determined
by the game dynamical aspects and the model parameters, appear somewhat restricted,
all assumption are intuitively plausible and of sufficient general character. The game
dynamics allow for different initial populations to develop in the wide field of regularity
and payoff monotonicity only provided that the population describes a compact interval
in the line of reciprocity. Likewise, the payoff function which defines reproductive success
in the society stands for a wide variety of different strategic games.
There are several observations which we can make easily. To start with, note that both
players’ equilibrium reciprocity values sum up to 1, i.e. α∗+ β∗ = 1. This fact guarantees
that both players’ regard for the opponents’ payoff is identical.
Corollary 1. θ∗1 = θ∗2.
Proof. Since α∗ + β∗ = 1, we have θ∗1 = α∗︸︷︷︸
=1−β∗
·γ1 + β∗︸︷︷︸
=1−α∗
·γ2 = θ∗2.
This result is not surprising because asymmetry of the equilibrium payoffs emerges
not on the level of the players’ overall concern but only with respect to the intrinisc
preferences of the players. The next observation regards a comparing of our basic result
with the outcome in the one-dimensional population model.
Corollary 2. The two-dimensional population model may develop a different overall con-
cern than the one-dimensional population model does.
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Proof. Let us write down only one simple example. Consider l = −0, 25, γ1 = −0.8, and
γ2 = 0.4. Then, the two-dimensional population develops an outcome that is approxi-
mately α∗ ·γ1 +β∗ ·γ2 ≈ −0, 08 and the outcome of the one-dimensional population model
corresponds to l2−l = −0, 1.
However, the fact that the strategic environment determines the sign of the overall
concern is an observation which is of general character.
Corollary 3. The players show a negative overall concern if strategic substitutes are
present, i.e. l < 0⇒ θ∗1 = θ∗2 < 0. If the underlying game exhibits strategic complements,
then, the players’ value their opponents’ payoff positively, i.e. l > 0⇒ θ∗1 = θ∗2 > 0.
This result is reminiscent of the pioneering work of Bester and Güth (1998) where
strategic complements leads to altruism and strategic substitutes to selfishness.21 The
following observation regards the reciprocity motive and its conclusion holds universally
for the case of strategic substitutes, i.e. l ∈ [−1/4, 0), and partly for the case of strategic
complements (l ∈ (0, 3/5]).
Corollary 4. There exists a threshold ζ (l) ∈ A such that
∂α∗ (γ1, γ2, l)
∂γ2
< 0, for γ1 < ζ (l) , (18)
and
∂α∗ (γ1, γ2, l)
∂γ2
> 0, for γ1 > ζ (l) , (19)
and for the second player likewise. A rough conclusion of this observation works as follows.
If player A’s intrinsic lies below the threshold, then the will to reciprocate to player B
increases as player B gets more nasty. Likewise, if player A’s intrinsic lies above the
threshold, then the will to reciprocate to player B increases as player B gets more nice.
Furthermore, the threshold is increasing in the strategic setting l.
As the fractions of Ineq. (18) and Ineq. (19) are no continuous functions for the parame-
ter constraints when strategies are complements, the conclusion derived from these inequa-
tions is limited for l ∈ (0, 3/5]. In particular, for strategic complements and some values
of γ1 ∈ A, denote γˆ1, there is a critical point for γ2 such that α∗ (γˆ1, γ2 − δ, l ∈ (0, 3/5]) <
α∗ (γˆ1, γ2, l ∈ (0, 3/5]) > α∗ (γˆ1, γ2 + δ, l ∈ (0, 3/5]), for positive δ, and for the second
player likewise.
21However, the finding under strategic substitutes is restricted there, which is due to Bester and Güth’s
presumption of a non-negative preference space, and extends to spitefulness if the zero-barrier is abrogated
(cf. Bolle, 2000; Possajennikov, 2000).
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4 Conclusion
Building upon the assumption that individuals adjust their actions to achieve higher sub-
jective utility, while dynamical pressures change the composition of reciprocal preferences
in the population according to the players’ objective gains, this study provides a prognose
concerning the emergence of strong reciprocity in a wide class of strategic interaction.
The specific conception of reciprocity is defined by the players tendency to response to the
perceived intrinsic attitudes of others. The basic finding is that a high degree of flexibility
(in the reciprocal sense) pays off. In our setting, it is the strategic environment and the
specific other players’ type which determine the players’ behavior and only marginally
their usual, exogeneous given, intrinsic attitudes. The unique dominance solvable profile
of reciprocity in our asymmetric setting, and hence the only survivor under any regular
and payoff monotonic selection process, motivates an altruistically inclined player to be-
have spitefully if strategies are substitutes and the opponent player is intrinsically spiteful.
Conversely, the reciprocity norm of a spiteful player motivates him to show altruistic be-
havior if strategies are complements and the opponent player is intrinsically altruistic. In
this regard, our study provides an economic and cultural explanation to the question why
people often show a different behavior than they usually would. The study further sub-
stantiates related work which shows that the strategic environment determines the players
equilibrium behavior in one-dimensional preference models. In particular, the fact that
strategic substitutes lead to a negative emotion and strategic complements to a positive
emotion is once more confirmed, even in the new setting of two preference dimensions.
A further conclusion of our work is that if player A is relatively spiteful, then player A’s
tendency to reciprocity is higher the nastier player B—if player A is relatively nice, then
player A’s tendency to reciprocity is higher the nicer player B. However, this conclusion is
restricted in the sense that it holds universally only for the case of strategic substitutes.
One can think of several extensions of our basic model. Since preference biases act
like commitment devices which form the other players’ equilibrium strategies to a certain
extent, it would be interesting to explore whether the qualitative results maintain in cases
where the players do not recognize the other players’ types perfectly. For instance, one
can think of situations where the players’ types are observed with some noise because they
do not learn the types of each other, or where some players intentionally signal a wrong
disposition in order to benefit from the resulting strategic effect. It would further be inter-
esting whether our results can be identified in experimental studies—an admittedly subtle
task since the individual usual types have to be ascertained before a norm of reciprocity
can be examined.
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Appendix A. A generic class of evolutionary dynamics
To analyze the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, we build upon the generic class of
selection dynamics as proposed by Heifetz et al. (2007). This section is intended to sketch
the distinctive attributes and advantages of this class. To this end, imagine the following.
At each instant in time t ≥ 0, two players are randomly drawn from a continuum
population to play a certain game. In particular, the population is characterized by the
distribution Gt ∈ ∆ (Θ), where ∆ (Θ) is the set of Borel probability distributions over
the compact space Θ =
[
θ, θ
]
. The population evolves over time in the space of ∆ (Θ)
according to the following differential equation.
G˙t (S) =
∫
S
g (θ,Gt) dGt (θ) , S ⊆ Θ Borel measurable, (A.1)
where g : Θ ×∆ (Θ) → R is a continuous growth-rate function. The following definition
further specifies the dynamics.
Definition 3. The continuous growth-rate function g : Θ×∆ (Θ)→ R is payoff-monotonic
and regular if for every G ∈ ∆ (Θ), the following conditions hold:
• A higher average fitness corresponds to a higher growth-rate, or formally,∫
f
(
θ, θ´
)
dGt
(
θ´
)
>
∫
f
(
θ˜, θ´
)
dGt
(
θ´
)
⇐⇒ g (θ,Gt) > g
(
θ˜, Gt
)
. (A.2)
• Gt is a probability distribution for every t,∫
Θ
g (θ,G) dG (θ) = 0. (A.3)
• g can be extended to the domain Θ×X, where X is the set of signed Borel measures
with variational norm smaller than 2, such that g is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz
continuous on Θ×X. Formally,
sup
θ∈Θ
|g (θ,Gt)| <∞
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣g (θ,Gt)− g (θ, G˜t)∣∣∣ < K ∥∥∥Gt − G˜t∥∥∥ , Gt, G˜t ∈ X, (A.4)
for some constant K, where ‖G‖ = sup
|h|≤1
|∫Θ hdG| is the variational norm on signed
measures.
Oechssler and Riedel (2001, Lemma 3) show that regularity of g guarantees that the
mapping G→ ∫Θ g (·, G) dG is bounded and Lipschitz continuous in the variational norm,
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which implies that the differential Eq. (A.1) has a unique solution for any initial distribu-
tion G0.22
The dynamics defined here formalize the simple idea that only individuals who play
well in the population increase while individuals who play badly decrease. As mentioned
in the introduction, the underlying evolving process may rely on a biological level or on
a cultural level. Accordingly, more successful types have more descendantes who carry
the genes of their parents, or more successful types are more likely to be adopted under
a cultural process of education or imitation from role-models. Alternatively, Heifetz et al.
(2007) mention that the same mathematical structure is compatible with the idea that
successful individuals have more influence on the dynamic process since they appear more
often in economic interactions, and so, are more likely to be reproduced.
Dealing with the concept of dominance solvability requires a deeper understanding of
the concept of domination and some additional notations. To begin with, we say that θ′ is
dominated by θ whenever f (θ, θ′′) > f (θ′, θ′′) for every θ′′ ∈ Θ. Then, let D1 denote the
set of types θ′ which are dominated by some θ ∈ Θ, and U1 is the set of undominated types,
i.e. U1 = Θ \D1. Further, Dn is the set of dominated types after at most n iterations and
the set of undominated types is accordingly Un = Θ \ Dn. Then, θ′ ∈ Un is dominated
in iteration n + 1 by θ ∈ Un if f (θ, θ′′) > f (θ′, θ′′) for every θ′′ ∈ Un. We say that θ′
is serially dominated if it is dominated after some number of iterations. Under regular
and payoff monotonic dynamics any serially dominated types are extinct in the limiting
population. A game is dominance solvable if there is a unique type that is not serially
dominated. The analyzes of reciprocity in this paper is based on this class of selection
dynamics and on the following theorem of Heifetz et al. (2007) which extends results from
Samuelson and Zhang (1992), where the population evolves according to matrix games,
to continuous strategy spaces.
Theorem. (Heifetz et al. (2007)) Consider a symmetric two-player game with strategy
space Θ =
[
θ, θ
]
⊂ R, a continuous payoff function f : Θ × Θ → R, and a regular,
payoff-monotonic growth-rate function g : Θ × ∆ (Θ) → R. Moreover, assume that the
22To see that the replicator dynamics forms a special case of the generic dynamics determined by Eq.
(A.1), consider a growth-rate function which evolves according to the subtraction of the population average
success from the success of a single type (the difference is sometimes called the excess payoff ). Formally,
Gt evolves according to
G˙t (S) =
∫
S
[f (θi, Gt)− f (Gt, Gt)] dGt (θi) , S ⊆ Θ,
where
f (θi, Gt) =
∫
Θ
fi (θi, θj) dGt (θj)
is the expected success of individual i played against a randomly chosen individual j. And, the population
average success is
f (Gt, Gt) =
∫
Θ
∫
Θ
fi (θi, θj) dGt (θj) dGt (θi) .
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population G has initially full support over the compact space Θ and evolves according
to the differential equation as defined by Eq. (A.1). Then, types θ which are serially
dominated are asymptotically weeded out, i.e. they have a neighborhood V 3 θ for which
limt→∞Gt (V ) = 0. In particular, when the game is dominance solvable to equilibrium θ∗,
then Gt converges in distribution to a unit mass at θ∗.
Appendix B. Figure and Table
Figure 3 presents the possible sets of γ1 and γ2 in 5 different strategic situations l:
l = −0, 25, l = −0, 05, l = 0, 05, l = 0, 25, and l = 0, 5. The graphics show that we an-
alyze situations where the intrinsic preferences of the two populations are predominantly
different, i.e. sign (γ1) is predominantly different from sign (γ2). The graphics also show
that in the case of strategic substitutes l < 0, we do not consider populations with positive
γ1 and positive γ2; likewise, in the case of strategic complements, we do not consider cases
where γ1 and γ2 are both negative.
Figure 3: γ1,γ2-sets.
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Table 1 shows some dominance solvable results with respect to different game param-
eters. For expositional clarity we focus on the same “representative” environments as
in Figure 3: we assume 5 different cases which examine the strategic environment, i.e.
l = −0, 25, l = −0, 05, l = 0, 05, l = 0, 25, and l = 0, 5, each with a two population setting
of different intrinsic preferences. The table basically shows that a dominance solvable reci-
procity trait is apt to reverse the players intrinsic attitude. This finding holds in settings
with strategic substitutes (l < 0) as well as in those with strategic complements (l > 0).
For example take l = −0, 25, i.e. strategic substitutes, then if the γ1-player is moderate
altruistic (γ1 = 0, 3) and the opponent player is of type γ2 = −0, 3 then the dynamics
drive the γ1-player to a relatively reciprocal norm (0, 25) such that the overall concern
becomes negative. The fact that the sign of the strategic environment determines the sign
of the overall concern can also be observed in the table.
Exogeneous game parameters Dominance solvable traits (approximate values)
Strategic setting Intrinsic preferences Reciprocity Overall concern
l γ1 γ2 α∗ β∗ θ∗1 = θ∗2
−0, 25 −0.9 0, 1 0, 125 0, 875 −0.025
−0, 25 0, 3 −0, 3 0, 25 0, 75 −0, 15
−0, 05 −0, 6 0, 3 0, 35 0, 65 −0, 015
−0, 05 0, 6 −0, 1 0, 087 0, 913 −0, 039
0, 05 0, 7 −0, 2 0, 262 0, 738 0, 036
0, 05 −0, 7 0, 5 0, 4 0, 6 0, 02
0, 25 0, 4 −0, 5 0, 67 0, 33 0, 103
0, 25 −0, 3 0, 2 0, 19 0, 81 0, 105
0, 5 0, 6 0, 1 0, 478 0, 522 0, 339
0, 5 −0, 7 0, 3 0, 166 0, 834 0, 134
Table 1: Results in different situations.
28
References
Andreoni, J., P. Brown, and L. Vesterlund (2002): “What Produces Fairness? Some Experimental
Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 1–24.
Andreoni, J. and J. Miller (2002): “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consis-
tency of Preferences for Altruism,” Econometrica, 70, 737–753.
Bester, H. and W. Güth (1998): “Is Altruism Evolutionary Stable?” Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 34, 193–209.
Bolle, F. (2000): “Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable? And Envy and Malevolence? - Remarks on Bester
and Güth,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 131–133.
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2000): “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition,”
American Economic Review, 90, 166–193.
Bulow, J., J. Geneakoplos, and P. Klemperer (1985): “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes
and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 488–511.
Camerer, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction, Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Charness, G. and M. Rabin (2002): “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004): “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 47, 268–298.
Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher (2006): “A Theory of Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior, 54,
293–315.
Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2002): “Why Social Preferences Matter–the Impact of Non-selfish Motives
on Competition, Cooperation, and Incentives,” The Economic Journal, 112, C1–C33.
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.
Frank, R. (1987): “If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One
with a Conscience?” American Economic Review, 77, 593–604.
——— (1988): Passions within Reason: The strategic Role of the Emotions, W.W. Norton, New York.
Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1989): “Psychological Games and Sequential Ra-
tionality,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60–79.
Gintis, H. (2000): “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206, 169–
179.
Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982): “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum
Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 3, 367–388.
Güth, W. and M. Yaari (1992): “Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An
Evolutionary Approach,” in Explaining Forces and Changes: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics,
ed. by U. Witt., University of Michigan Press.
Harrison, R. and M. Villena (2008): “On the Evolution of Reciprocal Behavior: A Game Theoretic
Approach,” Working Paper.
Heifetz, A. and E. Segev (2004): “The Evolutionary Role of Toughness in Bargaining,” Games and
Economic Behaviour, 49, 117–134.
Heifetz, A., C. Shannon, and Y. Spiegel (2007): “The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences,” Economic
Theory, 32, 251–286.
29
Hofbauer, J., J. Oechssler, and F. Riedel (2009): “Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The
Continuous Strategy Case,” Games and Economic Behavior, 65, 406–429.
Hoffmann, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith (1998): “Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experi-
mental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology,” Economic Inquiry, 36, 335–352.
Huck, S. and J. Oechssler (1999): “The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Alloca-
tions,” Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 13–24.
Levine, J. (1998): “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
1, 593–622.
Maynard-Smith, J. and G. Price (1973): “The Logic of Animal Conflicts,” Nature, 246, 15–18.
Moulin, H. (1984): “Dominance Solvability and Cournot Stability,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 7,
83–102.
Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (2005): “Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity,” Nature, 437, 1291–1298.
Oechssler, J. and F. Riedel (2001): “Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces,” Economic
Theory, 17, 141–162.
Possajennikov, A. (2000): “On the Evolutionary Stability of Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 42, 125–129.
Rabin, M. (1993): “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic
Review, 83, 1281–1302.
Samuelson, L. and J. Zhang (1992): “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 57, 363–391.
Schelling, T. (1960): The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Selten, R. (1980): “A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology, 84, 93–101.
——— (1991): “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 3–24.
Sethi, R. and E. Somanthan (2001): “Preference Evolution and Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 97, 273–297.
——— (2003): “Understanding Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50, 1–27.
Sobel, J. (2005): “Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43,
396–440.
Trivers, R. (1971): “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–58.
Weibull, J. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
30
